Disaster Management Discussion

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Disaster Management Discussion



Nursing homework help

I have 3 of my classmates posts. I need you to respond to each one separately. Also, one source at least for each one of them. Don’t write about how good their posts or how bad. All you need to do is to choose one point of the post and explore it a little bit with one source support for each response. The paper should be APA style.


Question: Research and provide an example of the success between a government and the international response community. First: MO To start, India was criticized for restricting aid to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which allegedly prolonged the suffering of the people there who were left without assistance (Margesson, 2005). The country also initially turned down offers of international aid despite widespread death and destruction that was obviously out of the league of their emergency management capabilities (Margesson, 2005). The country eventually accepted offers of aid; however, the response was unnecessarily delayed (Margesson, 2005). Once relief supplies made their way into the country, the government allegedly seized them and distributed them in a discriminatory fashion (India has a caste system) according to a few large NGOs, like the Red Cross (Margesson, 2005). Overall, the response of the Indian government was widely inefficient and might have been hindered by local corruption (Margesson, 2005). In the future, relationships and agreements between vulnerable countries and the international community should be made before a disaster to allow for the useful and timely administration of relief efforts. When composing these agreements, the international community should be sensitive to the recipient’s potential desire to restrict the military operations of other countries, since it could be viewed as an opportunistic occupation of the affected nation. In contrast, Thailand allowed immediate intervention from the international community (Margesson, 2005). The decision to allow unrestricted access of the country to the US military forces was likely due to previously established good relationships between the two countries, which extended to other relief organizations as well. Other entities, including Japan, Singapore, the UN, the World Food Program, and the World Health Organization, were expediently welcomed into the country to assist how they could (Margesson, 2005). During the summer courses, we were told that networking is critical in emergency management and that the worst time to work with someone for the first time is during a disaster. The concept extends to countries as well – and the relationships built between Thailand and members of the international relief community probably facilitated relief efforts. Cultural sensitivity, when responding to international humanitarian events, is paramount. The history of the country and the wishes of its government cannot be ignored, but neither can the needs of its citizens. It presents an interesting ethical dilemma for both NGOs and developed nations with robust international response capabilities. Political exploitation and experiences with imperialism may prevent countries from accepting aid from the international community, which is why I think the facilitator role that the United Nations has is critical. They can send a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams to affected areas, which can be seen as a relatively neutral force and facilitate acceptance of further international involvement (UNOCHA, 2019). Knowing the limitations of local disaster management capabilities is crucial for the coordination of a smooth and appropriate response. In the future, I’d like to see countries accept and engage in humanitarian efforts altruistically and put aside political motivation. It’s a lofty goal, but one that would help save lives in the immediate aftermath of a devastating event. Margesson, R. Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations (2005). Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a461370.pdf United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). (2019, April 16). UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC). Retrieved from https://www.unocha.org/our-work/coordination/un-disaster-assessment-andcoordination-undac. Second: Fai Humanitarians play a pivotal role in reinstating normalcy when crises occur. Disaster management requires proper coordination of activities between the relief agents and other support groups, such as the government (Alexander, 2015). Humanitarian operations include many participants. Some of them belong to the affected country, and others originate from other countries. They work in the same area to fulfill a common objective. However, cooperation among them is often constrained. There are instances of misunderstandings between humanitarians and the host nations. Besides, the lack of collaboration between relief agents and other aid partners during disaster operations occurs. For example, international humanitarians and security personnel may lack coordination. Therefore, what are the incidences where humanitarians fail to coordinate with either the host government or other relief stakeholders? Conflicts have engulfed humanitarianism in some host countries. Relief agencies provide health and food assistance in disaster-stricken areas in the world (Saavedra & Clarke, 2015). Nevertheless, they have been linked to odd actions that have resulted in conflicts with host states. For instance, conflicts erupted between International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Sudan during the civil wars. There was a lack of transparency about the credentials of staff hired by INGOs (Jayasinghe, 2011). Frequently, the hired INGOs staff assumed critical duties, such as providing healthcare services and ensuring human rights. This enabled them to interact with many individuals from different backgrounds. They easily influenced the aid recipients. The intensity of their influence made them be seen as interfering with the national politics of Sudan. This condition caused conflicts between INGOs and Sudan and has led to complicated work relationships between them. Humanitarians have ascended to power in the nations where they provide aid. Over time, the donors have risen to power and have finances that exceed budgets of some developing nations (Role governments in humanitarian response to disasters, 2010). While providing aid in poor nations, they change a country’s policies to suit their working conditions. For instance, there was an emphasis by some donor groups to spearhead malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis treatment only, yet the help may not be the prioritized initiative in the specific countries. These interventions were selective since they provided specific health services. In such circumstances, the host government and the donors do not cooperate effectively due to power contests. There is a lack of cooperation between the relief aids and other response partners while working in disaster response settings. For instance, there lacks coordination between humanitarians and military personnel during disaster management operations. Increasing the number of foreign security personnel during humanitarianism makes it challenging to distinguish between the militaries and relief agencies. Scrutinization of the Hurricane Mitch response in Central America is a good illustration. There was poor cooperation between the humanitarians and the military. Also, a similar scenario occurred in Haiti during the 2010 earthquake (Haysom & Gordon, 2012). It was disastrous to manage the numerous humanitarians who were present during the incident. Besides, their cooperation with the military was frail. Therefore, in some incidences, integrating the donors with other close partners is complicated due to lack of coordination; hence, it has a significant impact on the aid operations. In conclusion, some factors hinder the smooth delivery of humanitarian aid due to lack of coordination and conflicts with the host government and also with other relief donors during disaster response. Some aid agencies conflict with the host country due to power disputes like in the case of INGOs and Sudan. Correspondingly, there is a lack of cooperation among relief donors. These factors adversely affect integration between humanitarians with either the host government or with other relief parties. References Alexander, D. (2015). Disaster and emergency planning for preparedness, response, and recovery. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.013.12 Haysom, S., & Gordon, S. (2012). Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil–military coordination. Retrieved from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/7679.pdf Jayasinghe, S. (2011). Erosion of trust in humanitarian agencies: what strategies might help? Global Health Action, 4(1), 8973. doi:10.3402/gha.v4i0.8973 The role of national governments in international humanitarian response to disasters (26). (2010). Retrieved from https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/26-meetingbackground-paper.pdf Saavedra, & Clarke, K. (2015). Working together in the field for effective humanitarian response (30). Retrieved from https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/alnap-30-am-paper-workingtogether.pdf Third: Ibra There are many examples of effective responses between many governments around the globe and the international response community. In this post, however, I will focus only on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) model of coordination response with the international community to prevent, protect from, and respond to Ebola virus diseases (EVD). The DRC Model of International Coordination Response Since the Ministry of Health in Congo (MOH) confirmed a new EVD in 2018, the DRC government represented by its MOH has coordinated with the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to effectively respond to the Ebola outbreak (World Health Organization, 2018). This coordination response will likely maximize the effort of preventing and responding to this outbreak. For instance, while the WHO deploys Regional Emergency Directors, who evaluate and support the response actions, the UNHCR is responsible for protecting and assisting refugees and ensuring that these refugees are in safe places. In 2018, for example, the UNHCR hosted and protected over 35,000 refugees in Congo (World Health Organization, 2018). The IRC is also partnering with MOH to support many priority health facilities in responding to EVD (The IRC, 2019). According to the IRC (2019), there are more than 50 local health clinics led by the IRC’s Ebola response team to focus on protecting the populations from EVD and preventing this disease from spreading. This organization also has established triages zones in health centers and hospitals around the areas in which the Ebola outbreak has been seen. The purpose of this triage is to screen all incoming patients for symptoms of Ebola, and if there is any symptom, these patients will be isolated immediately. Hence, this integration model has been an effective response to protect the affected populations in the DRC, and I think this integration response will likely support this country financially to expand the level of response to such this disease outbreak. To my mind, I believe that funds play a crucial function in minimizing, protecting, and responding to infectious diseases. Thus, with the support of the United Nations, the DRC will likely receive much budget to provide such as medical equipment, infection control activities, and building community capacities in hazard zones (World Health Organization, 2018). Furthermore, when these organizations aim to establish a strategic response plan, they will likely rely on how much funds will be needed to create this strategic approach. For example, in 2019, the WHO estimated that the activities of the Response Plan for the next six months would likely require more than $250 million. The Results of This Effective Coordination Response Although encountering difficulties in responding to EVD in the DRC, the international response has responded to this outbreak successfully. This international effort has focused on implementing epidemiologic surveillance and published daily updates, and weekly situation reports to evaluate what has been done and ensuring that all actions are active and in progress (Kalenga et al., 2019). I thus believe that with such effective organizing, the international response will likely enhance the level of responding to EVD. Here are some definite objectives that will likely be accomplished with this effective integration response and based on the updated reports: 1- Developing and establishing a new strategic response plan. 2- Strengthening political responsibility, security, and operational support to improve acceptance of the reaction and access insecure areas 3- Developing the healthcare system and collaboration of the actions of local and international partners. 4- Increasing the level of preparedness across the surrounding provinces and neighboring countries prevent spreading EVD. References International Rescue Committee. (2019). What it will take to tackle Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved October 23, 2019, from https://www.rescue.org/article/what-it-will-take-tackle-ebola-democratic-republic-congo Kalenga, O., Moeti, M., Sparrow, A., Nguyen, V., Lucey, D., & Ghebreyesus, T. (2019). The Ongoing Ebola Epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2018-2019. (Report). The New England Journal of Medicine, 381(4), 373–383. Retrieved from https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMsr1904253 World Health Organization. (2018). Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of Congo: External Situation Report 9. Retrieved from https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/272785/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20180608eng.pdf World Health Organization. (2019). Strategic Response Plan for the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak in the Provinces of North Kivu and Ituri Democratic Republic of the Congo (July – December 2019). Retrieved from https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/documents/drc-srp49august2019.pdf?sfvrsn=679e4d26_2